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Hospitality, Protection and Refuge in Early English Law1 
Abstract 
This article explores the ideas and values which underpinned legally recognised practices of 
providing protection to the vulnerable in Anglo-Saxon England (c.500-1066). Prominent among these 
is sanctuary in churches but this should be understood as part of a wider tradition of offering refuge 
to those in danger, rooted in secular notions of hospitality and honour. Membership of a community 
in this period inhered in legally binding social relationships – reciprocal ties of kinship and 
hierarchical bonds modelled on the household – which simultaneously protected individuals from 
harm and established local sureties obliged to make good any harm they did. Outsiders, lacking such 
relationships, were both threatening and vulnerable. Hospitality was exceptional, in that hosts were 
entitled to protect guests without becoming liable for their actions. This allowed them to provide 
refuge to the vulnerable, from refugees to thieves, and the Anglo-Saxon elite may well have felt 
honour-bound to do so, but it was necessarily temporary. The host-guest relationship expired after a 
few days, theoretically leaving thieves in danger and refugees needing to form less advantageous 
but sustainable long-term relationships. 
Introduction 
One of the most well-known features of medieval law is the refuge function of churches, which – 
though specific rules varied significantly in different times and places – were often able to offer 
powerful protection to those who fled to them. Indeed, medieval practices of ecclesiastical 
sanctuary are traditionally understood as antecedents to modern political asylum (e.g. Price 2009). 
Whether or not this view is justified is a question for historians of later periods. This article explores 
the social and cultural logic which underpinned the refuge function of churches in England during 
the Anglo-Saxon period (c.500-1066), not only because it is valuable to understand ecclesiastical 
sanctuary as part of its broader environment but also because the issues which this exploration 
raises are close to the core concerns of this volume. To understand the refuge function of churches 
in this period, I would like to argue, we need to understand what it meant to be an outsider – a 
foreigner or a stranger – in English society, the reasons such people were a source of anxiety, and 
the methods by which they could be protected and integrated both in the short and long term.  
Moreover, I would contend that it is through these ideas that we can get closest to understanding 
the situation of people whom modern observers might be tempted to label ‘refugees’. Forced exile 
appears to have been a common outcome of internal conflict in this period, though in an early 
medieval context it is perhaps particularly unlikely that a sharp distinction existed between ‘political’ 
refugees and those whose exile was a consequence of ordinary wrongdoing (cross reference 
Orchard). It is also worth noting that, especially in its early centuries, the Anglo-Saxon period 
witnessed a great deal of warfare, some of which may well have produced refugees; in a couple of 
cases, at any rate, our sources’ descriptions have led historians to use terms such as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ (Campbell 2000: 34-5). The likelihood is that refugees existed in this period; the problem is 
that we do not have the sources to study them directly. The best we can do is investigate the legal 
and cultural framework which would have shaped the way refugees, as outsiders, were understood 
and treated. We may not be able to study early medieval refugees themselves, but we do have 
access to at least some of the ideas and structures which would have constituted, to borrow Peter 
Gatrell’s term, early medieval ‘refugeedom’ (cross reference Gatrell). This article thus aims to 
elucidate part of the web of cultural assumptions and legal structures which – in an age without rigid 
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rules about citizenship – distinguished locals from outsiders, because doing so provides important 
context for understanding two subjects relevant to the concerns of this volume: both the logic 
underlying the refuge functions of churches and the difficult position which refugees are likely to 
have occupied in Anglo-Saxon society. 
Ecclesiastical Sanctuary 
First, some background on ecclesiastical sanctuary and how it has been approached by medieval 
historians. The refuge function of churches in the Middle Ages was underpinned by ideas drawn 
from a range of sources. It originally developed in the context of the late Roman Empire, in a fusion 
of secular aristocratic practices of intercession on behalf of clients with the pastoral concerns of 
churchmen keen to ensure that wrongdoers were not, through execution, denied the opportunity to 
do penance for their sins and attain salvation (Shoemaker 2011: chs. 1-2). The sanctuary practices 
that emerged from this context owed relatively little to the explicit biblical model of ‘cities of refuge’ 
visible in several books of the Old Testament, though this did become significant in some later 
strands of thought (Shoemaker 2011: 53-5). However, it is important to note that at least in England, 
at no point in the medieval period – from conversion in the seventh century to sanctuary’s demise in 
the 1540s – did the right to refuge in churches recognised in secular law correspond at all closely 
with ecclesiastical models. It was not, as might be assumed, simply that strong kings were unwilling 
to recognise the Church’s claims to protect wrongdoers from the full rigour of the law; the 
misalignment was deeper than that, with legal protections frequently falling short of ecclesiastical 
ideals in some respects – for example, in allowing sanctuary-seekers to be punished in supposedly 
unacceptable ways – whilst exceeding them in others, such as in allowing protection to supposedly 
excluded categories of wrongdoer (Lambert 2012b).  
The underlying reason for this is that traditions of refuge in churches also drew on a web of ideas 
and values that owed little to Christian doctrine, or indeed to the legacy of Rome, the contours of 
which – much more so than learned ecclesiastical thought on the subject – remain relatively obscure 
in modern scholarship. In England, at least, this observation pertains particularly to the earlier 
medieval period on which this article focuses, because in the late twelfth century the institution of 
sanctuary assumed a fixed form which would remain largely unchanged until its abolition in the 
1540s – a form which was an important part of the fabric of the English legal environment, 
accommodated and exploited in various ways, but increasingly detached from broader social values 
and assumptions (Lambert 2012b: 117-23). In the earlier period, by contrast, ecclesiastical sanctuary 
had clear secular analogues; it made sense as part of an ecology of ideas visible in the Anglo-Saxon 
legislative tradition. The existence of a non-religious context for ecclesiastical sanctuary in this 
period has to some extent been recognised by modern historians. It has tended to be understood as 
a practical aspect of dispute-resolution processes (sanctuary providing a period of peace in which 
settlements could be negotiated in feuds) and as an expression of the power of kings, which 
underpinned the protection churches offered (Riggs 1963, Hyams 2003: ch. 3, Shoemaker 2011: ch. 
5). To the extent that sanctuary has been treated as a reflection of essentially secular ideas, it has 
been seen as an institution designed specifically for peace-making purposes, and thus a 
manifestation of the ‘strong conciliatory ethic’ that characterises at least some aspects of early 
medieval law (Shoemaker 2011: 50). I do not wish to challenge the accuracy of this assessment here 
but rather to flesh it out: the treatment of refuge in Anglo-Saxon law (in churches and elsewhere) 
often makes sense in the context of reconciling enmities, but this article will argue that anxieties 
about outsiders – simultaneously threatening and vulnerable figures – and the notion of hospitality 
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can provide a fuller, more satisfying context for the legal protections available to those seeking 
refuge in early medieval English society.  
The Anglo-Saxon Period 
Before we turn to the evidence itself, a very brief sketch of the Anglo-Saxon period and its evidence-
base may be helpful. Politically, this period saw considerable change. In the seventh century most 
(but not all) of the area we think of as England (and much of what we now regard as southern 
Scotland) was ruled by kings who can reasonably be termed ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or ‘English’: rulers of 
peoples who traced their origins to various obscure Germanic migrant groups – mostly from what 
Peter Heather (cross reference Heather) helpfully terms the ‘outer periphery’ of the Roman Empire 
– which crossed the North Sea in the period after the collapse of Roman Britain in the early fifth 
century. These kings’ kingdoms were relatively small and numerous at this stage, though powerful 
overlords could assemble large alliances of subordinate rulers for military expeditions. Larger 
kingdoms tended to absorb smaller neighbours over time, reducing the number of independent 
kingdoms drastically by the ninth century, and only one of these – Wessex – was able to endure the 
large-scale Scandinavian attacks of the late ninth century. In the tenth century, the West Saxon royal 
house took advantage of the destruction of its English rivals, extending its domination over most of 
the territory they had once ruled and creating in the process a single kingdom of England (Yorke, 
1990, Molyneaux 2015). This kingdom was to be conquered by Duke William of Normandy in 1066, 
the conventional end-point for the Anglo-Saxon period of English history.  
Throughout this period the vast majority of the population were engaged in mixed agriculture, 
though there was a gradual and incomplete shift in the balance from primarily pastoral farming at 
the start of the period to more intensive arable production at its close. Urbanisation was initially 
limited – a handful of coastal trading settlements serving as centres for the import of elite luxury 
goods – but relatively rapid economic growth, especially from the late tenth century, led to the 
emergence of a network of small market towns by the end of the period. The evidence for social 
structure is difficult, but the earliest laws imply that the Anglo-Saxons understood themselves as a 
society of free farmers, working their own land with the help of slaves and the landless free 
population. A very wealthy aristocracy, defined at least in part by personal military service in royal 
households, was supported by the food renders and labour services which these free farming 
households owed to the king (in proportion to the amount of land they held). There were thus 
always significant disparities of wealth in this society but these probably became noticeably greater 
as the period progressed, with the aristocracy becoming more entrenched and numerous and the 
number of independent free farming households declining. (That such a shift took place is generally 
accepted but its significance and timing are disputed, see Faith 1997: 123-5, cf. Wickham 2005: 347-
50.)  
On legal matters, the Anglo-Saxons had a strong tradition of local communities assembling to issue 
authoritative judgements in legal disputes;  the coercive power underpinning these judgements was 
largely drawn from a combination of the offended parties (violent vengeance was a legitimate 
element of legal practice) and collective expeditions mounted by communities. The laws assume the 
latter to be the ultimate sanction against wrongdoers whose offences were understood to warrant 
punishment in addition to any compensation owed to victims (theft, in particular, was a major focus 
of communal concern). Kings were always potential sources of coercive power in cases where they 
had particular interests, but the first evidence that royal officials were expected to be responsible for 
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routine law-enforcement does not appear until around the year 1000 (Lambert forthcoming, ch. 6). 
Our main sources for legal matters in this period are texts of laws, mainly but not exclusively issued 
by kings. We have an early cluster of four texts, three Kentish and one West Saxon, from the period 
c. 600-725 and significantly larger late Anglo-Saxon corpus from the period c. 890-1020. These later 
texts almost all represent English law, which emerged from the West Saxon legal tradition, as 
opposed to the much more obscure Scandinavian legal customs that applied in what came to be 
known as the Danelaw (comprising, roughly, East Anglia, the East Midlands and Yorkshire). Because 
we have very limited records of actual cases – and because those records are unrepresentative, 
being overwhelmingly concerned with disputes involving the aristocratic elite and landed property – 
there is significant uncertainty about how the rules recorded in these law texts relate to practice 
(Wormald 1999). They are, however, excellent sources for the way contemporaries thought about 
law, and about their own society more generally, which is what this article seeks to explore. 
Communities and Outsiders 
 
If a stranger or man from afar quits the road and neither shouts nor blows a horn, he shall 
be assumed to be a thief and as such may be either slain or put to ransom (Wi 28, Ine 20).2 
This passage, which occurs in laws from both Kent and Wessex in the late seventh century, is often 
used to illustrate the hostile attitude of Anglo-Saxon society to outsiders, who are clearly regarded 
as problematic and potentially threatening figures. This may well have relatively little to do with any 
Anglo-Saxon cultural tendency towards xenophobic attitudes, and rather more to do with the basic 
fact that outsiders were – by definition – not integrated into local networks of mutual suretyship and 
shared responsibility that shaped legal practice and to a significant extent constituted community 
membership in this period (Taylor 2014). If a stranger caused harm in a locality and then fled the 
area there was little that anyone could do about it, no obvious avenue through which an aggrieved 
party might seek redress. Strangers posed a threat. 
The situation for local people was different. This is most obviously illustrated by the case of 
homicide. Our earliest evidence for English law – the essentially pre-Christian tariff of compensations 
put into writing at the behest of King Æthelberht of Kent shortly after his conversion around the year 
600 – is generally at pains to emphasise that individuals ought to take responsibility for their own 
misdeeds (Abt 30).  Nonetheless, the shared liability of families is made plain in a passage which 
considers a situation in which a man killed and fled the country: the killer’s family were still liable to 
pay half the  victim’s wergild – the formal value his life, payable to a dead man’s kinsmen in cases of 
homicide (Abt 23). The general expectation that families share responsibility for individuals’ 
wrongdoing is thrown into relief in passages which consider problematic situations in which 
offenders lacked a full set of relatives. The late ninth-century laws of King Alfred consider the 
possibility that a free man who killed might not have paternal kinsmen: in such a situation, they 
state, his maternal kinsmen were liable for a third of the wergild and his gegildan the other third – if 
unable to pay the final third personally the killer must flee into exile. If the killer had no kinsmen at 
all his gegildan were liable for half the wergild (Af 30-30:1). The gegildan are obscure (the word 
means ‘associates’ or, more precisely in certain contexts, ‘fellow guild members’) but they are 
evidently functioning as substitute kinsmen here: men lacking in local kinsmen were clearly expected 
somehow to  form bonds of mutual suretyship with others to make up, at least partially, for the 
deficit. (One text from around the turn of the millennium sets out  the regulations of an aristocratic 
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guild in Cambridge that did something similar but we can only speculate as to how representative 
these regulations might be; see Thorpe 1864: 610-13.)  
One of the key features of an upstanding local freeman, then, was that he had local relatives who 
shared liability for his actions, people who could be made to pay compensation if he caused harm 
and fled the area. Even local men who lacked relatives were thus potentially troubling, but the 
construction of artificial mutual suretyship groups to substitute for absent kinsmen could solve the 
problem to an extent. Other potential sources of anxiety were the unfree, who almost by definition 
lacked free relatives who could be held responsible for their actions. The solution here, however, 
was simple: their owners were liable for their actions if they fled (Hl 1-4). Landless free people, who 
perhaps might sometimes live and work in households distant from their families, were dealt with 
similarly: a late seventh-century law explains if there were no other sureties (presumably a reference 
to kinsmen or substitute kinsmen) the heads of the households in which such people worked were 
liable to make good the value of any goods they stole, should they escape the area (Ine 22). Later, in 
the early tenth century, one law suggests anxiety about landless men serving in districts far from 
their family homes – most plausibly read as a reference to young warriors serving in the households 
of powerful political figures – insisting that whenever they returned to their native districts to visit 
their families, the head of whichever household they were staying in took full responsibility for their 
behaviour, to the extent of paying any compensation they incurred (II As 8). If the reciprocal bonds 
of kinship (real or artificial) were unavailable, then, another way of safely embedding potentially 
threatening people in a locality was through more hierarchical arrangements: they could enter a 
subordinate relationship with an immediate superior, who would in return accept liability for their 
compensation payments should they commit an offence and flee. This is how Alfred’s laws, at the 
end of the ninth century, deal with foreign traders: they insist that the leader of any group take 
personal responsibility for all the others, ordering that he present them to a communal assembly in 
the presence of a royal official and guarantee that he can produce them at such an assembly in the 
event of their being accused of wrongdoing (Af 34). 
Though it is not always made explicit, the structuring concept in these hierarchical bonds is that of 
the household. Heads of household were evidently understood to have accepted a degree of 
responsibility for all resident dependants’ behaviour when they accepted them into their homes, 
even if (especially in the earlier evidence) this is often only as a backup in cases not covered by 
reciprocal bonds on the model of kinship. This relationship between head of household and 
dependant is the model on which bonds of personal lordship are based (on different forms of 
lordship, see Baxter 2007: ch. 6). This is visible etymologically. The Old English word from which we 
get ‘lord’, hlaford, derives from hlaf-weard: ‘loaf-guardian’; this can be juxtaposed with hlafæta, a 
rare early word for ‘dependant’ which literally means ‘loaf-eater’. The very language of lordship is 
rooted in household relationships. Heads of households were necessarily lords to dependants who 
lived in their homes but they could also choose to bind themselves as lords to non-resident 
dependants, recognising them as members of what was essentially a metaphorical household. By the 
early tenth century, at least, it seems that such relationships were coming to be regarded as an 
essential aspect of safely integrating potentially troublesome individuals into local communities. 
Laws from the reign of King Æthelstan (924-39) express anxiety about ‘lordless men from whom no 
justice can be obtained’, ordering that the kinsmen of any such man find a lord willing to accept him, 
a process of persuasion which – if the man in question was notoriously untrustworthy – could 
involve formally indemnifying the lord against the liabilities he was accepting (II As 2-2:1; III As 7:2). 
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Even if financial liability ultimately rested with the family, then, by this point it was perceived as 
important that every man be bound into the metaphorical household of a nobleman – a figure of 
sufficient wealth and status to be relied upon to provide proper compensation for victims should the 
offender himself flee. 
Outsiders, by definition, were people who lacked local connections. Because they were not bound 
into the locality by reciprocal ties of kinship (real or artificial) or by the hierarchical structure of the 
household (real or metaphorical), they represented a potential threat in a very real sense. The 
possibility of their committing an offence and fleeing was much more dangerous than for local 
figures because it would leave offended parties with no reliable avenue for redress. And because 
strangers’ characters were unknown, locals could not rule out the possibility that their intentions 
were hostile. The most obvious theme running through Anglo-Saxon legal texts is the hatred and 
fear of thieves: men who not only take other people’s property but make every effort to conceal 
their responsibility, and thus to leave victims with no hope of recouping their losses (Lambert 
2012a). It is not surprising that the stranger, his intentions suspect and with no local ties through 
which he might be pursued, raised the spectre of theft; a stranger actually caught behaving furtively 
– failing, as the law quoted above envisaged, to announce himself in a place he had no reason to be 
– was so obviously threatening a figure that he did not deserve a second chance. Such strangers 
presented a clear danger not just to the individuals who found them sneaking around but to all their 
neighbours; to capture or kill one was a service to the community as a whole.  
The other side of this coin, of course, is that people travelling in places where they were outsiders 
were in an extremely vulnerable position. If they made a point of demonstrating their honest 
intentions – for instance by blowing a horn or shouting to make their presence known if they ever 
found themselves in a location where their presence might be regarded as suspicious – they may 
have been unlikely to encounter open hostility, but they would probably have had little reason to 
expect more than a cautious reception in places where they unable to claim even a tenuous 
connection to a local figure. The lack of solid, legally recognised bonds which made outsiders 
threatening to locals likewise made locals threatening to outsiders. This is because the same 
relationships which obliged kinsmen and pseudo-kinsmen to accept liability for one another’s 
misdeeds also provided them with protection. To take the most extreme scenario, killing a free man 
was a grievous affront to his kinsmen, who (unless they were willing to be openly mocked for their 
cowardice) had little option but to pursue the matter vigorously, either taking violent vengeance 
against or exacting a large compensation payment from the killer and those bound to support him. 
The knowledge that this was the case provided an obvious deterrent to harming people, the effect 
of which must have been much greater for those with local families than for those whose relatives 
were distant and less directly threatening. Heads of household and personal lords were in a similar 
position to families: entitled to compensation for harm done to those under their protection and 
honour-bound to take action to extract it. The sums involved were generally much smaller – 
Æthelberht’s laws (c. 600) state that a freeman’s wergild was 100 shillings, whereas the sum paid to 
a free householder for killing his dependant (hlafæta, ‘loaf-eater’) was only 6 shillings – but the 
principle was the same (Abt 21, 25).  
The vulnerability of those who, for whatever reason, lacked the protection that came with 
household and kinship bonds is clearly recognised as a problem in the laws. One late seventh-
century passage, considering the possibility of emancipating a slave, is particularly revealing on this 
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point. The freed slave, because he lacked a free kindred and was no longer bound to a particular 
household, was in a dangerous position: as no-one had a duty to protect him there was little to deter 
others from harming him, even killing him. The law’s solution to this problem was to assert that the 
emancipator continued to be bound to his former slave as a protector, entitled to his wergild should 
he be killed (Wi 8). The discussion of the liability for killings committed by men who lacked kinsmen 
in the late ninth-century laws of Alfred, interestingly, is immediately followed by the statement that 
if such a man was killed – one with no relatives whatsoever – his wergild was to be divided between 
his gegildan and the king (Af 31). Again we see the expectation that those who lacked kinsmen 
would somehow bind themselves to substitutes, but also the idea that the king had a particular duty 
to step in to protect the vulnerable. This is most clearly articulated in an early eleventh-century text: 
If any attempt is made to deprive a … stranger of either his goods or his life, the king (or the 
earl of the region) and the bishop of the diocese shall act as his kinsmen and protectors, 
unless he has some other. And such compensation as is due shall promptly be paid to Christ 
and the king according to the nature of the offence; or the king … shall avenge the offence 
(EGu 12). 
The main message to take from this evidence, it seems to me, is that the vulnerability of outsiders 
was a recognised problem, and a particular concern for churchmen (all the relevant evidence 
appears in laws notable for their strong Christian flavour). The ecclesiastical ideal may well have 
been for kings to act as guardians for the weak and for emancipated slaves’ former masters to take 
their protective responsibilities seriously, but in the absence of evidence bearing on whether this 
was realised in practice we probably ought to be sceptical. Likewise, one (again obviously 
ecclesiastical) law text asserts that strangers ought to be able to deny legal accusations by simply 
swearing an oath at an altar, according them the same privilege as a member of the king’s own 
household (Wi 20). This makes sense because strangers would have been in no position to do what 
was normally required to deny a charge, which was to assemble a specified number of upstanding 
local men willing to support an oath of denial with an oath of their own, but the expectation that 
local assemblies would willingly accept the unsupported word of a suspicious stranger in such 
circumstances may well have been rather idealistic. 
Hospitality and Its Limits 
The central point here is that the Anglo-Saxon laws suppose a world in which protection and 
responsibility go hand in hand as the key legal manifestations of the social relationships by which 
local people were embedded in their communities. The bond of kinship obliged men, in effect, to act 
as sureties for their relatives – potentially incurring substantial liabilities for compensation payments 
– but it also made them protectors, entitling them to receive compensation when one of their 
number was killed (and perhaps, though this is obscure, to share in compensation payments for 
lesser offences). Hierarchical relationships modelled on the household worked in the same way: they 
meant that personal lords and heads of household accepted some responsibility for their 
dependants’ misbehaviour, but they also established a duty to protect which – though it came with 
the obligation to take action – could lead to financial benefits. Outsiders were problematic figures, 
simultaneously threatening and vulnerable because they lacked such relationships; they were 
neither protected from harm, nor did local communities have any assurance that harm they caused 
would be rectified. The only wholly satisfactory way to overcome these issues was to integrate 
outsiders into these local structures, attaching them permanently to local households and kindreds 
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(or forming substitute kinship ties like those represented by the obscure gegildan of Alfred’s laws). 
That is to say, the problems posed by outsiders could only be solved fully if they ceased to be 
outsiders and became locals.  
A more temporary solution was provided by hospitality: it went some way to solving the problems 
posed by threatening and vulnerable outsiders, but it raised issues of its own in the process. (For a 
recent discussion with references to earlier scholarship, see Gautier 2009.) From the outsider’s 
perspective, the benefits of hospitality were obvious: as well as providing food and shelter, hosts 
were understood to act as protectors to people they invited into their homes. This principle is visible 
from our earliest evidence onwards. The laws of Æthelberht of Kent (c. 600) are clear that killing 
someone in the house of either the king or a nobleman required compensation to be paid not just to 
the slain figure’s family but to the owner of the house they were in when they were killed (Abt 5, 
13). Ordinary free men are not mentioned in that text, nor is the treatment of offences other than 
killing, but these are addressed in detail in our next set of Kentish laws, written in the 680s. Not only 
are violent acts within houses represented as an offence against their owners, but also insulting and 
provocative behaviour: snatching a drinking cup from a fellow guest, verbally insulting him, or 
drawing a weapon (even if ultimately no harm was done). Lesser sums are specified for these more 
minor infractions of a host’s protection, but ‘if the house becomes bloodied’ the owner was entitled 
to his full mundbyrd – the financial value of his protection, which varied according to status (Hl 11-
14). To harm or even to act provocatively towards a guest was to insult the host, to breach his 
protection in a way which required compensation.  
Inviting an outsider into one’s home was thus a way of offering him security; the relationship 
between host and guest to some extent bound the outsider into the host’s household, rendering him 
much less vulnerable. Although the formal protection provided was relatively small – the 
compensation that would be owed to the host in the event of a guest being killed would be far less 
than the full wergild owed for a local freeman – the practical security provided was probably rooted 
in qualitative social logic rather than quantitative legal calculation. To harm another man’s guest in a 
drunken argument was one thing – a forgivable lapse of judgement in the heat of the moment, 
perhaps, providing due compensation was paid – but to seek him out in order to cause harm would 
be a deliberate and serious insult of the sort that, regardless of its financial consequences, could 
permanently end good relations between neighbours.  
A host’s offer of hospitality probably, except in unusual circumstances, eliminated the threat posed 
to his guest by other locals. But to what extent did hospitality end the threat posed by the outsider 
to the locality? In social terms it probably provided some degree of reassurance. The host’s provision 
of hospitality ought to be understood as a form of gift – not just of food and shelter but of 
protection – and this put the guest under an obligation to reciprocate, which as an outsider was a 
difficult thing to do. Making any form of trouble for one’s host would effectively be to throw his 
hospitality back in his face, repaying his kindness with an insult. Any guest with a sense of honour 
would understand a host’s hospitality as imposing an obligation to behave appropriately during his 
stay in the locality, and this probably meant that when a local householder accepted a potentially 
threatening stranger into his home his neighbours’ concerns diminished to some extent.  
What hospitality did not do, however, was formally transfer liability for a guest’s misdeeds to the 
host. The laws explicitly state that such liability only came into existence once the relationship 
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between host and guest  became so long-standing that it no longer qualified as mere hospitality. This 
is from the laws of Kings Hlothhere and Eadric of Kent, issued in the 680s: 
If a man entertains a stranger (a trader or any other man who has come across the frontier) 
for three nights in his own home, and then continues to provide him with food, and if he [i.e. 
the stranger]  does harm to anyone, the man [i.e. the host] shall bring the other to justice or 
make amends on his behalf. (Hl 15; see also II Cn 28, ECf 23:1) 
Hospitality was by definition a temporary arrangement. For three days the link between protection 
and responsibility that characterised Anglo-Saxon socio-legal bonds did not apply: hosts protected 
their guests like members of their households, but they did not become liable for any harm that they 
did. Once those three days were up, however, the relationship had to be normalised: the guest 
needed either to leave or to become a full member of the host’s household, with both parties 
accepting the obligations that entailed.  
Hospitality and Refuge 
I would suggest that this aspect of hospitality – the householder’s right to offer a guest protection 
without becoming liable for his offences, albeit only for a limited period of time – underlies the use 
of both houses and churches as places of refuge in this period. Most Anglo-Saxon laws on this 
subject have essentially the same features: they recognise various figures’ right to offer protection 
to fugitives without assuming liability for whatever they had done to provoke pursuit, but only for a 
limited time. It is important to note that there are two contrasting contexts in which the laws discuss 
this refuge function, and that the way it is presented is conditioned by these contexts. 
On the one hand there is the context of feuding: one group has been affronted and is seeking 
vengeance (perhaps but not necessarily for the death of a family member) and the person they are 
pursuing flees to a house, a church or to a powerful nobleman for protection. In this context, the 
laws view the protection provided very positively: the ideal outcome in such a situation is not 
violence, which could beget further violence in retaliation, but a negotiated settlement in which the 
party seeking vengeance is persuaded to accept compensation instead. A temporary period of 
protection in which tempers could be cooled and negotiations begun was an entirely positive 
contribution to this goal. The laws of Alfred, from the late ninth century, provide a highly detailed 
scheme for how this was meant to work, which is applied to both houses and churches. Those who 
know their enemy to be at home, or pursue him to a church, are not to attack him within until they 
have demanded justice (i.e. compensation), and even then they are not to breach the confines of the 
house or church. Rather, they are to besiege him within for up to seven days, after which he is to 
surrender himself into their custody on the conditions that he remain unharmed for a further thirty 
days and that his kinsmen be informed of his situation, providing them with the opportunity to 
negotiate a settlement (Af 5-5:3, 42-42:3). Eventually, in the mid-tenth century, the protection 
offered by any and every house was given powerful royal backing: attacking someone in a house was 
defined as hamsocn and treated as a breach of the king’s personal protection (II Em 6; Lambert 
2012a: 27). The laws’ evident enthusiasm for protection in this context ought to make us cautious in 
their interpretation; in particular, it is possible that Alfred’s elaborate scheme of seven days’ 
protection followed by thirty as a hostage represents idealistic thinking rather than any practical 
reality (in the case of houses, in particular, the absence of any penalties for failing to follow the 
procedures outlined provides grounds for suspicion).  
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The other context in which a fugitive might attempt to use a church or house as a refuge is more 
revealing because law-makers’ attitude to it was essentially hostile. There were certain offences – 
theft is by far the most prominent – which were understood not merely to harm their immediate 
victims but to pose a serious threat to the community as a whole. Rather than a peaceful 
compensation settlement between the parties, the ideal in such cases was harsh punishment; this 
led some laws to treat people who gave hospitality to fugitives as offenders in their own right. For 
instance, the laws of Ine of Wessex (688-726) state that those unable to deny having knowingly 
sheltered a fugitive are to forfeit their own wergilds – the value of their own lives – to the king, and 
several laws from the reign of Æthelstan (924-39) threaten those who harbour fugitives of various 
types with severe punishment (Ine 30; II As 2-2:2, 20:8; IV As 3-3:2; V As Prol 1- Prol 3).  
Another of Æthelstan’s laws, however, goes into considerably more detail on this point: 
And we declared in the assembly at Thunderfield that if any thief or robber fled to the king, 
or to any church, or to the bishop, he should have a respite of nine days. If he flees to an 
ealdorman [a great magnate], or an abbot, or a thegn [a nobleman], he shall have respite of 
three days. If anyone slays him within that period of respite, he shall pay as compensation 
the mundbyrd [protection-value] of the protector.... But let [the thief] seek what protection 
he may, his life shall be spared only for as many days as we have declared. And he who 
harbours him longer shall be liable to the same treatment as the thief (IV As 6-6:3).  
This law is important because it is somewhat absurd. It imagines thieves fleeing to the protection of 
various noble figures, being entitled to succour, but being handed over for execution as soon as a 
three- or nine-day period had elapsed. It is hard to imagine that, in practice, the noble figures in 
question would not recoil from the idea of surrendering supplicants to their deaths. This is clearly a 
law intended to override any such objections in order to achieve the higher goal of ensuring that 
known thieves did not escape execution. What is interesting about it is that, in spite of this evident 
agenda, it accepts the legitimacy of limited periods of refuge: it may have been thinkable to put 
noble protectors in this difficult position, but their right to offer protection to whomsoever they 
wished for a limited time could not legitimately be challenged. It seems likely that behind this law lay 
conflict: a major royal anti-theft campaign having to acknowledge and work around the legitimate 
objections of aristocrats concerned to maintain their protective rights. 
This has two important implications. The first, simply, is that it implies that at least some early tenth-
century aristocrats regarded their right to offer protection as sacrosanct – something worth raising 
as an almost certainly unwelcome obstacle to a powerful king’s legislative programme. The second is 
that, when pared back to its bare minimum by law-makers who (in this particular context) regarded 
it as an inconvenience, the right to offer refuge to fugitives clearly boils down to the standard legal 
right to offer hospitality. As we have seen, a host could offer a guest food, shelter, and protection for 
up to three days without incurring liability for his wrongdoing, but after that period has elapsed he 
either had to send him on his way or take responsibility for him. The rights of ealdormen, abbots and 
thegns, as outlined in Æthelstan’s laws, follow this model precisely, even down to the three-day 
time-limit. Kings, bishops and churches can protect for longer, but there is no qualitative distinction: 
it is simply that their rights are greater as befits their higher status. The right to offer refuge to 
wrongdoers was at root the right to offer hospitality. Moreover, it was a matter of considerable 
11 
 
cultural importance that aristocrats be able to offer hospitality, and the protection that went with it, 
to people who feared for their lives – even figures as generally despised as thieves.  
Why should this be? The implication, I suspect, is that a nobleman risked dishonour if he refused a 
plea for hospitality from someone in danger of being killed, because such a refusal could readily be 
interpreted a sign of weakness or even cowardice, an admission that he feared to defy the fugitive’s 
pursuers. Hospitality in its ideal form was an act of generosity undertaken voluntarily by a host with 
no moral obligation to his guest, and at some risk to himself (Shryock 2008); prohibiting honourable 
men from behaving in this way was unacceptable. This would fit well with wider discourses on 
hospitality and honour (Kerr 2002, cf. Gautier 2009) but it is surprisingly difficult to prove with the 
evidence available. A strong hint in this direction is provided by an early eleventh-century law 
prohibiting various people from entering the presence of the king: 
And if secret murderers or perjurers or open killers presume so far as to remain anywhere 
close to the king, before they have made amends to both God and the world, they shall be in 
danger of losing their lands and goods, unless they are peace-supplicants (VI Atr 36). 
The underlying logic here is probably that people who commit grievous sins and refuse to do 
penance represent dangerous spiritual pollutants, capable of tainting those who associate with 
them. They are not only to be kept away from the king, as here, but excluded from burial with other 
Christians and (in more rhetorical passages, at least) cast out of the land entirely. The king in 
particular needed to avoid being tainted by association because his kingdom’s wellbeing was 
understood to depend to some degree on his maintaining a favourable relationship with God 
(Lambert forthcoming, ch. 5). Kings thus had good reason to want to avoid contact with deeply sinful 
and unrepentant people. Why, then, the exception for ‘peace-supplicants’ (friðbena)? The 
implication seems to be that the king will make an exception to this general exclusion from his 
presence for people who are seeking his protection, presumably because they fear violence of some 
sort. If this is the correct interpretation, this passage shows that the king’s duty to offer hospitality 
and protection to people in danger was so important that it compelled him to offer refuge to people 
who, in normal circumstances, he would not have tolerated in his presence. 
Conclusions 
What, then, does this tell us about the history of refugee protection? On one level it is significant 
because of its implications for traditions of ecclesiastical sanctuary: in early medieval England, at 
least, these appear to have been shaped at least as much by secular ideas about honour and 
hospitality as by religious doctrine. It is not that explicitly Christian discourses on sanctuary are 
entirely absent in laws from this period, as there are a few passages which treat sanctuary as a 
pastoral tool in a way that aligns well with sanctuary’s late antique roots: as a means by which 
grievous sinners’ lives could be spared, giving them time to undertake penance and thereby attain 
salvation (Ine 5, Wl 1, ECf  5-5:3). However, the understanding of hospitality as a necessarily 
temporary relationship in which a host provides a guest with protection without accepting 
responsibility for his actions is, I would contend, the best explanation for the time-limits on refuge in 
churches that dominate Anglo-Saxon sanctuary law, and indeed would later characterise the 
standard right of sanctuary in English churches that lasted from the late twelfth century until the 
Reformation (Lambert 2012b). The broader point here for Refugee Studies, perhaps, is that if 
medieval traditions of sanctuary in churches really were precursors to modern political asylum – a 
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notion to which the essays in this volume, at least, offer little direct support – these traditions ought 
to be understood as reflections of deeply rooted secular values and practices surrounding honour 
and hospitality, not simply as expressions of the fervent religiosity that modern observers tend to 
expect of the medieval period. The values underpinning early medieval sanctuary were not, in fact, 
very different from those expressed by Lord Palmerston, as quoted in Phil Orchard’s contribution to 
this volume (cross reference Orchard), and they are far from unique to Christian cultures (e.g. 
Dresch 1989: 53-65). 
The bigger point, however, is not about churches at all. Anglo-Saxon refuge practices were products 
a world in which permanent membership of a community was established through legally binding 
social relationships – both the reciprocal ties of kinship and the more hierarchical bonds modelled 
on the household – which both protected individuals from harm and ensured the existence of local 
sureties obliged to make good any harm they did. Hospitality severed the link between protection 
and responsibility, allowing hosts to protect guests without having to stand surety for them. Such 
exceptional relationships were problematic and could only be allowed to persist temporarily. That 
they were allowed to exist at all must in part come down to the basic need to socialise with 
neighbours without becoming liable for their misdeeds. Nonetheless, the importance attached to 
extending hospitality and thus protection to people in danger – even thieves – suggests that 
something more was at stake. Honourable men were meant to be generous and hospitable; though 
it would be rather naïve to imagine that the early medieval Englishmen valued hospitality to the 
extent that all requests for food and lodging had to be accepted on pain of incurring dishonour, the 
implication does seem to be that refusing hospitality to the extremely vulnerable – people who 
faced death if they were not taken in – was the sort of cowardly act the Anglo-Saxon elite tended to 
judge harshly. That is to say, there is good reason to think that the Anglo-Saxons had a similar 
‘humanitarian’ ethos to that which Benjamin Gray discerns in Greek tragedies in his contribution to 
this volume: a belief that when the stakes were high, the powerful were honour-bound to offer 
protection to the vulnerable (cross reference Gray).  
It seems likely that these ideas and values were deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon society. They are 
implicit in our earliest evidence and they become more explicit later on: the significance of 
hospitality in underpinning refuge functions is much more clearly articulated as a result of those 
refuge functions coming into tension with the priorities of more aggressive tenth-century royal 
legislation. However, it is also probably true to say that this late Anglo-Saxon legislative activism had 
an effect on attitudes to legitimate sources of protection. Early tenth-century laws, as we have 
noted, recognise that various types of noblemen have a right to offer what amounts to hospitality 
even to thieves, but they do not concede this to ordinary freemen. Similarly, the mid-tenth-century 
extension of powerful royal protection to all houses would theoretically have made hosts’ protection 
of their guests against external aggressors much less relevant, particularly at the lower end of the 
social spectrum (II Em 6; Hn 80:10-80:12). What we may be seeing is the beginning of a long-term 
trend towards a restriction of the right to offer refuge to fugitives: what had probably begun as a 
general right, a by-product of every free householder’s ability to offer hospitality, seems to have 
been coming to be regarded as a privilege of a social elite in the tenth century, and it was certainly 
limited to churches by the later medieval period. Today we tend to assume that the right to offer 
refuge to fugitives is a by-product of territorial sovereignty, its legitimate manifestation being the 
concept of ‘political’ asylum. In England, at least, the gradual process by which this came to seem a 
self-evident truth may have begun in the Anglo-Saxon period. 
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How, then, were refugees treated in Anglo-Saxon England? As was noted at the start, we cannot 
really know, but the ideas surveyed here at least allow us to make some solidly educated guesses. It 
seems likely that Anglo-Saxon communities would initially have found an influx of refugees – 
strangers with no local attachments – very threatening. There may well have been a serious risk of 
open hostilities erupting in such circumstances, but providing this was avoided it is unlikely that the 
locals would have thought it acceptable to allow the refugees to starve, and they probably would 
have tried to ease tensions in the short term with offers of hospitality. This could only be a 
temporary measure, however, and in the medium term this would probably have given way to the 
subordination of the refugees through their integration into local hierarchical structures of 
household and lordship. Potentially this could have involved some high-status refugees serving as 
warriors in great royal and noble households, but most – if they lacked the economic means to set 
themselves up independently and were unable to dominate their hosts militarily – would 
presumably have had to accept dependent ties to lords of one sort or another, just like the poorest 
stratum of Anglo-Saxon society. One late seventh-century law implies that those who are given not 
just land by a lord but also provided with a house become tied to him permanently, losing their right 
to leave (Ine 67). For the lowliest, integration may well have involved a form of enslavement. (For an 
interesting anthropological parallel to such a process, see Colson 1970).  In the long run, perhaps, 
inter-marriage would have formed kinship bonds between the refugees and their hosts, contributing 
(as part of a broader pattern of cultural assimilation) to the erosion of the distinction between locals 
and incomers. This, at least, seems to be the general trend in this period: ethnic differences that 
mattered in the seventh century, such as that between Britons and the English in Wessex, fade into 
obscurity by the tenth. This is all speculative, of course, but this sort of analysis at least allows us to 
approach the history of refugee protection in this period. 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Olaf Kleist for organising the seminar series and workshop that led to this special issue 
and the other participants for their thought-provoking contributions. Though I was unable to produce a draft 
in time for him to comment on it directly this paper owes a great deal to conversations with Paul Dresch over 
five years in Oxford. 
2
 Anglo-Saxon laws are cited using the now-standard system of abbreviations established in Liebermann 1898-
1916. English translations of most texts can be found in  Attenborough 1922 and Robertson 1925. The online 
‘Early English Laws’ database (http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/) also provides a comprehensive listing of 
texts and their published editions and translations. 
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